Philosophers of religion are a relevant expert class in worldview questions
by David Leech.
Based on a presentation given by David Leech at an EA for Christians Academic Workshop in April 2023.
Summary
selection effects are not a strong enough reason to dismiss philosophers of religion as a relevant expert class
selection effects do not only affect the philosophy of religion, so by symmetry, philosophy of religion should not be discounted as an expert class on this ground alone
the expert class status of the philosophy of religion need not depend on whether the field has formed an expert consensus
it is at least possible that strong futility may supervene on a naturalistic EA worldview, which is a plausible prima facie reason for rigorous worldview exploration
Why some EAs do not take the philosophy of religion seriously as an expert class: putative selection effect
In the previous post, I proposed that philosophers of religion are a relevant expert class for worldview questions, so there is a prima facie case for EAs to take the philosophy of religion seriously. A perusal of the (few) posts on the Effective Altruism Forum which refer to philosophy of religion, suggests that some within the EA community may be inclined to discount analytic philosophy of religion as an expert class even before getting down to considering arguments for or against particular worldviews (theism, atheism etc) at the object level. But I will argue in this post that there is no reason from EA principles why EAs must do this.
Here is a reason why secular EAs may – and do – discount philosophy of religion as an expert class. Let us say it is reasonable, by default, to defer to ‘elite common sense’ where we are not an expert in some area. Indeed, Gregory Lewis argues this in In defence of epistemic modesty: ‘One’s all things considered judgement on P should be just that implied by an idealized expert consensus on P, no matter one’s own convictions regarding P.’ But if we turn, for instance, to the results for the question ‘God: atheism or theism?’ in Bourget and David Chalmers’ 2020 PhilPapers Survey of philosophers (results, paper), 74% of philosophers of religion answer ‘theism’, as opposed to e.g. 16 % for metaphysicians and 13 % for philosophers of mind. On the assumption of epistemic modesty, and without any defeater, this would seem to suggest that secular EAs, in matters of worldview, should defer to what appears to be the expert consensus of philosophers of religion, the majority of whom appear to believe in or lean towards theism. This should also hold even if other philosophers reported much lower levels of theistic belief (as they do), because philosophers of religion are the subject matter experts.
But some secular EAs do think there is a defeater, because they believe a selection effect is at work within the field of the philosophy of religion. For instance, in The despair of normative realism bot Joe_Carlsmith mentions as a potential explanation for the high number of theists within the philosophy of religion, that ‘one is more inclined to devote one’s career to studying something one thinks more substantively real; and more likely to become invested in this reality if it becomes importantly tied to one’s career.’ This may well be true. It is not as though budding philosophers of religion all enter the field as agnostics impartially exploring the arguments pro and contra different worldview positions, and then mostly converge on theism. Indeed, the selection effect suspicion (which, it should be noted, would also explain the atheistic, as well as theistic, stances of philosophers of religion) would receive further support from Draper and Nichols’s 2013 analysis of the state of health of the philosophy of religion, if their analysis is broadly on the mark.1
Some reasons why EAs should take the philosophy of religion seriously, selection effect or not
However, I now want to suggest some reasons why secular EAs should not discount the philosophy of religion as an expert class, and why they can – and, I think, should – engage in the philosophy of religion and remain open to a range of worldview positions including, but not limited to, theism.
Firstly, As Joe_Carlsmith observes, selection effects do not only affect the philosophy of religion. He wonders, for instance, whether this is true in ethics generally, in which case it would ‘complicate[] the sense in which the meta-ethical views of the experts should be deferred to…complications in this vein apply to the views of experts in other fields as well — for example, views about AI timelines.’ By symmetry, then, philosophy of religion should not be discounted as an expert class on this ground alone.
Secondly, the expert class status of the philosophy of religion need not depend on whether the field has formed an expert consensus (or an expert consensus which is free of any selection effect). It is plausible to think that philosophers of religion, collectively, have some claim to expert knowledge of, and experience of stress testing, the best rational cases that can be made for a range of worldviews, and that non-experts are at risk of remaining uncritical of worldviews, or reinventing the wheel, if they discount the field without engaging with it, relying instead on their reflexes or gut instinct.2 In addition, as Gregory Lewis notes, non-experts not only need a good explanation of why experts would be on the wrong track (usually, in terms of some kinds of biases), but also of why non-experts would not themselves be subject to such biases (as well as a lack of relevant expertise). Even if the philosophy of religion was riven with bias – which may affect atheist as well as theist philosophers of religion – why would non-experts outside the field have a better shot at tracking the truth without bias?
Thirdly, if metaphysical naturalism (Fodor’s tenet one: ‘the natural word is all that exists’) is true, it is plausible that strong futility may supervene on all human projects, even the most ambitious longtermist ones, and therefore on EA simpliciter. By strong futility, I understand with Seachris a scenario where ‘if the final state of affairs of [the universe] is one in which nothing matters, then nothing ever really mattered’.3
Given the prima facie challenge to the meaningfulness of EA projects which may be posed by metaphysical naturalism in this way, it seems reasonable that secular EAs could invest in trying to scope out philosophically whether strong futility, weak futility, or no futility at all supervenes on the assumption of something like the standard naturalistic EA worldview, and whether there may be rational grounds for taking other worldviews – on which futility may not supervene – seriously. This could, and perhaps should, motivate secular EAs towards engaging with philosophy of religion at an object-level. I explore this last issue in more detail in a third post.
Draper, Paul, and Ryan Nichols. 2013. “Diagnosing Bias in Philosophy of Religion.” The Monist 96 (3): 420–46.
EAs are in any case not clearly supportive of gut instinct – see for instance Benjamin Todd’s post here.
Seachris, Joshua. 2011. “Death, Futility, and the Proleptic Power of Narrative Ending.” Religious Studies 47 (2): 154-155.
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